The Confederates of the Army of Northern Virginia awaken on the morning of Tuesday,
July 1st, 1862, to find that the Federals have abandoned Glendale and its crossroads.
During the past five days, the Confederates have forced McClellan to retreat as much as 20 miles.
It is a significant achievement, but General Lee won’t be satisfied until
he has delivered a fatal blow to Major General McClellan’s Army of the Potomac.
The morning after the Battle of Glendale or Frayser’s Farm, Lee huddles with his
lieutenants over a crude map showing the primary roads on the Virginia Peninsula. It
is a shortcoming of the Confederate high command that Lee doesn’t have a more precise map showing
more of the secondary roads on the Peninsula. General Lee traces his finger along Quaker Road,
also known as Willis Church Road, and tells those present - Major Generals A. P. Hill, John
Magruder, D. H. Hill, Stonewall Jackson, and James Longstreet - that they are to march down Quaker
Road and get into position to attack the Yankees one more time. Lee’s map does not show Carter’s
Mill Road, which parallels Quaker Road to the west. His staff officers discover the road later
in the morning and use it to speed the arrival of part of the army to its proper positions.
After the meeting, Lee sends members of his staff to convey his orders to those not present,
including Major General Theophilus Holmes, who is on the River Road to the southwest and Major
General Benjamin Huger, who is on the Charles City Road to the west and, as it turns out, unaware
that morning that the Federals have abandoned Glendale. Lee believes that the Federals are
weary from marching long distances and fighting rearguard actions over the past five days. He
hopes that the fight that is brewing this day will be different from the others and that this time he
would win a decisive battle that would result in the destruction of McClellan’s entire army.
Because Longstreet’s and A.P. Hill’s soldiers are exhausted from the previous day’s battle
in which they bore the brunt of the fighting, Lee directs that they are to serve as the reserve.
The main attack is to be made by Jackson and
Magruder, whose commands are to be reinforced with additional troops.
Huger’s Division would join Magruder’s Command, while D. H. Hill would join Jackson’s Command.
Further orders will be issued once Lee is able to make a personal reconnaissance of the field.
McClellan had not been present on the field to direct his forces at the Battle of Glendale.
Nor would he be present when the fighting eventually gets under way at Malvern Hill.
On June 30th, he had ridden to Haxall’s Landing on the James River, which is closer to the
fighting than Harrison’s Landing. At Haxall’s Landing, he boards the gunboat USS Galena
and sails to observe a mission to bombard some of Holmes’ Rebels on the River Road.
It was clear by this time to McClellan’s staff that the general has completely lost his nerve
during the past week and no longer has the stomach to command his army. Fortunately for McClellan,
his corps commanders are well trained and experienced,
and they cooperate with each other on the battlefield.
Major General McClellan spends the night of June 30th aboard the Galena but rides to Malvern Hill
the following morning to inspect Major General Fitz John Porter’s deployment of the army
for the battle that is sure to occur this day. His greatest concern is that Lee will get behind his
army and outflank him. The distance between his army and Haxall’s Landing, because of the James
River’s course, is the greatest to the east. On that side, the Federals would have to cover a
two-mile stretch of low-lying ground. McClellan advises Porter to place three corps facing east
and use the other two corps to cover the north and west. The deployment makes sense considering that
the forward slope of Malvern Hill is narrow and only so many troops can be packed into that space.
After his inspection, McClellan rides back to the Galena.
Porter has about 85,000 troops under his command. To secure Malvern Hill, he borrows Brigadier
General Darius Couch’s First Division of Brigadier General Erasmus Keyes’ IV Corps. Brigadier General
George Morrell’s First Division of Porter’s V Corps is positioned on the west side of Malvern
Hill, while Couch’s division is deployed on the east side of the hill. Facing west and covering
the River Road is Brigadier General George Sykes’ Second Division of the V Corps, which is supported
by 37 guns packed tightly together to prevent a Confederate advance along the River Road.
George A. McCall’s Pennsylvania Reserves Division of the V Corps - which is now
being led by Brigadier General Truman Seymour following McCall’s capture the previous day at
Glendale - is stationed on the rear of the hill as a reserve. The reserve is further strengthened
by four brigades detached from Edwin Sumner’s II Corps and Samuel Heintzelman’s III Corps,
as well as a battery of heavy artillery that belongs to McClellan’s siege train.
Facing east and deployed between Western Run and Turkey Island Creek from north to south are the
rest of the corps of Heintzelman and Sumner, and also William B. Franklin’s VI Corps. John Peck’s
Second Division of Keyes’ IV Corps is situated between Turkey Island Creek and the James River.
Porter is assisted in his deployments by Brigadier General Andrew Humphreys, the chief topographical
engineer of the army and a member of McClellan’s staff. The initial Confederate attack is expected
from the north and perhaps also from the west. Facing north, the Federals are arrayed three
brigades deep on each side of Malvern Hill. Together, Morrell and Couch have 17,800 men.
The two Federal infantry divisions facing north on Malvern Hill are supported by six batteries
totaling 36 guns, with an equal number of guns on each side of the Quaker Road
as it bisects the hill between the Crew and West houses. It is a formidable position,
as D. H. Hill tells General Lee when he says, “If General McClellan is there in strength,
we had better let him alone.” To Hill’s remarks, Longstreet dismissively replies,
“Don't get so scared, now that we've got him whipped,” referring to McClellan.
Andrew Humphreys wrote of the position on Malvern Hill: “There was a splendid field of battle on a
high plateau where the greater part of our troops and artillery were placed.” If confidence comes
from numbers, the morale of those assembled must be high that morning. The array of Federal power
is a “magnificent sight,” said Humphreys. Malvern Hill is not a rounded knoll but an
elevated plateau that rises about 150 feet above river level. The strength of the position for the
Federals is that the cultivated fields of the two farms on its forward slope furnishes a splendid
field of fire. The plateau is about three-quarters of a mile wide, and a mile and a half long.
Flowing in a meandering fashion southeast past the north slope of Malvern Hill is Western Run,
a tributary to Turkey Island Creek, which empties into the James River. The stream banks throughout
the area are all heavily wooded, and crossing the streams is difficult for large units except
at bridges or fords. While the east slope of Malvern Hill gradually dips down to the creek,
a portion of the west slope is a rock cliff that precludes any assault by infantry.
Opposite Malvern Hill is an unnamed plateau about the same height as Malvern Hill. The
Carter and Poindexter farms north of Malvern Hill would serve as staging areas for the Confederate
attack. Behind Western Run on its east bank is the Poindexter Farm where Jackson’s Command would
deploy. Any Confederate troops marching along the Quaker Road and directed to deploy on the
Carter Farm situated on the Confederate right would have to cross Western Run. However, those
that arrive on the Confederate right via Carter’s Mill Road would avoid having to cross Western Run.
On the Carter Farm, Magruder’s Command is to form up for an attack.
Between the two plateaus is a dip in the landscape about 500 yards long
that the Confederates would have to cross to reach the base of Malvern Hill. The Federal artillery
atop Malvern Hill has sufficient range to not only target any infantry moving across the base
of the hill but also to reach the farms beyond, where the Confederates would deploy for battle.
In his morning briefing, General Lee instructs Jackson to take the road first and Magruder
and Huger to follow him. Longstreet and A. P. Hill are to follow at the rear of the column.
Any reconnaissance by the higher command would be handled as the troops are being deployed and not
earlier. The reason for this is that “we were on a hot trail,” wrote Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox.
No sooner has the march begun than problems occur. The inability of some of Lee’s commanders,
particularly Magruder and Huger, to promptly get their troops marching on the correct road will
disrupt Lee’s plans for a timely pursuit of the Federals that day. Magruder, who had not looked
closely at Lee’s map during the briefing, decides to depend on local guides to lead his division to
its position. More than one road in the region is named Quaker Road, and the guides lead Magruder’s
column west on the Long Bridge Road toward a small side road that also bears that name.
General Lee is feeling sick that morning, and he has asked Longstreet to help him lead
the army that day and substitute for him if necessary. Longstreet sees Magruder’s
Division marching east rather than south and sends a member of his staff after Magruder
to inform him of his mistake. When Magruder does not turn around, Longstreet rides after him.
By the time Longstreet reaches Magruder’s column, it has arrived at the intersection of the Long
Bridge Road and the wrong Quaker Road. Longstreet is unable to convince Magruder of his mistake,
but when one of Lee’s staff officers arrives with orders for Magruder to countermarch,
Magruder obliges. Lee’s staff officer informs Magruder that he does not need to march all the
way back to Glendale but instead he can take Carter’s Mill Road to his pre-attack position.
The mix-up delays the arrival of Magruder’s Command at the battlefront by three hours.
Huger also has trouble getting his men into position that morning. Because he is unaware on
July 1st that the Battle of Glendale is over, he has ordered two of his brigades - those of
Brigadier Generals Lewis Armistead and Ambrose Wright - to march south and attack the Federals
at Glendale in the flank. When Armistead learns that there is no enemy to attack that morning
at Glendale, he asks Lee for fresh orders. At the conclusion of Lee’s conference with
his lieutenants, a member of Lee’s staff rides to Huger’s headquarters on the Charles City Road
to the north to inform him of the army commander’s plans for the day. Huger,
a West Point graduate who is two years older than Lee, has extensive experience in ordnance matters,
but his talent for leading infantry leaves much to be desired. His experience in the Old Army perhaps
contributes to his reluctance to allow anyone other than himself to give orders to his troops.
That arrogance would contribute to the problems Lee faces getting his troops into
position for the attack on Malvern Hill. Since Magruder is not going to be able to
deploy as quickly as Lee has hoped, Lee orders Armistead and Wright to move by the Quaker Road
and deploy on the right of the Confederate line of battle where they would lead off the attack
on the Confederate right. The two brigadiers lead their combined 2,500 men to the location specified
and take up a position behind a ridge to await the arrival of artillery to contest the Federal guns.
Meanwhile, Jackson’s Command, which comprises four divisions, begins arriving on the Poindexter
Farm about 11:00 AM. For the coming battle, Jackson’s Command has been supplemented with two
new divisions. One of the attached divisions is led by D. H. Hill, and the other is led
by Brigadier General William H. C. Whiting. Whiting’s men march at the head of Jackson’s
column and are the first to arrive at the Poindexter Farm, where they take up a position
on the extreme left of the army. Major General Richard S. Ewell’s Division takes up a position
straddling the Quaker Road behind Western Run. When D. H. Hill’s Division arrives in the early
afternoon, it halts in the woods behind the Willis Church parsonage behind Western Run.
D. H. Hill’s Division is positioned in the center of the Confederate line, a place
that Lee originally had hoped that Huger would deploy. Jackson’s other division, led by Brigadier
General Charles Winder, brings up the rear. Not including D. H. Hill’s Division in the center,
Jackson has 20,000 troops in three divisions on the Confederate left flank to hurl at Porter.
By 12:30 PM, Armistead and Wright have their troops in position and are conducting their
own reconnaissance of the Federal position on Malvern Hill. They see a white house with several
barns around it at the top of the hill and some other buildings on the forward slope toward them,
which are the slave cabins. This is the Crew Farm. As for the Federal artillery,
the guns are nearly hub to hub. Behind them are several lines of infantry. The guns have a clean
sweep of the open ground across which the Rebels would have to charge to reach them. D. H. Hill,
who is making the same observation farther east, sees the same menacing forces.
“If the first line was carried,” wrote Harvey Hill, “another and another still more difficult
remained in the rear.” The Federal line “seemed almost impregnable,” said Major Joseph Brent, one
of Magruder’s staff officers, who rides ahead of Magruder’s column to observe the Federal position.
At 1:00 PM, the Federal guns facing north toward the Confederate main line begin a random
but steady bombardment of Confederate forces opposite them. As the shells crash around them,
graybacks in the open hug the ground, while those in the woods seek protection behind trees.
“The fire was a terrible one, and the men withstood it well,” wrote Armistead.
Lee has chosen to make his headquarters at a blacksmith shop opposite the Willis
Church parsonage. That morning, Lee tells Longstreet to make a personal
reconnaissance of the enemy position from the right side of the Confederate line of battle,
while he undertakes a reconnaissance of the left side. They meet back at the blacksmith
shop at noon to discuss final plans for the attack. Both have seen the need to establish
strong artillery positions to counter the Federal artillery arrayed against them and
knock out as many Federal guns as possible before the infantry assault can begin.
Lee gives verbal orders to his chief of staff, Colonel Robert Chilton,
which are to be crafted into a general order and distributed to the division commanders
and also to Armistead. Lee’s plan is to establish a “grand battery” on each flank that together
would provide a converging fire on the Federal guns. If the bombardment is successful, then the
infantry should advance. If not, an alternate plan of attack might be developed, Lee says.
The order, as penned by Chilton, reads as follows. “Batteries have been established
to act upon the enemy’s line. If it is broken as is probable, Armistead,
who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same.”
The order as written leaves much to be desired. It not only makes the presumption that the
Confederate counterbattery fire is likely to succeed, but also leaves the authority for
deciding whether the attack should go forward in the hands of a brigadier general. Moreover,
the decision to make the signal for the attack a yell is absurd, as it would be nearly impossible
for other commanders to know whether the yells they are hearing are from Armistead’s Brigade.
To make matters worse, Chilton fails to put a time on the order to indicate when it had been issued.
Jackson’s command has 10 batteries, and some of those have lumbered along the Quaker Road
with the divisions of Whiting and Ewell, which have arrived at the front by early
afternoon. Unfortunately for Jackson and the army as a whole, his chief of artillery,
Colonel Stapleton Crutchfield, is ill that day and no replacement has been designated for him.
Therefore, no officer is on duty to call up the batteries and show them where to deploy.
D. H. Hill, whose troops are likely to go forward into battle as they are positioned on Armistead’s
left flank, have no artillery at all. Hill has sent his artillery many miles to the rear for an
overhaul under an order previously given to him. It seems only logical that he should be given
replacement batteries from the army’s reserve, but no one can locate Brigadier General William
Pendleton, who commands the Artillery Reserve. Without Pendleton’s permission,
it will be impossible to obtain any of the 14 batteries in the reserve.
The responsibility for obtaining guns for service in the left grand battery eventually falls to
Jackson. Stonewall rides from the Poindexter Farm out to the Quaker Road in search of his division’s
batteries. He is able to locate three batteries - the Staunton Artillery, Rockbridge Artillery,
and Rowan Battery - and orders them to drive their guns onto the Poindexter Farm.
As for the right grand battery, it would have the advantage of more individual batteries,
but that factor is negated by the matter of each going into action at different times.
The batteries that unlimber on the ridge in front of Armistead come from four different commands.
Two batteries each come from Magruder’s and Huger’s divisions,
one from A. P. Hill’s Light Division, and one from the Artillery Reserve. Seeing the need
for as much artillery support as possible, A. P. Hill, who is on the north end of the Carter Farm
near the Long Bridge Road, sends forward his best battery, Captain William Pegram’s Purcell Battery.
On his own initiative, Captain Greenlee Davidson, commanding the Letcher Battery
which belongs to the Artillery Reserve, puts his battery into action in support of Magruder.
The availability of batteries on the Confederate right is never in question. In addition to the
six that either go into action or that attempt to go into action but are driven off by the Federal
guns, there are another six batteries nearby that stay idle. Ultimately, the responsibility
for the failure of these batteries would rest with Magruder, who has as many as 16 batteries under
his direct control that day, and six more are attached to Huger’s Division, giving Magruder a
total of 22 batteries, each with four to six guns. While it would be impossible to fit all of those
on the ridge opposite the Crew House, it certainly could accommodate more than one battery at a time.
As the day nears 2:00 PM, the batteries of the Army of Northern Virginia prepare
to exchange fire with the Union grand batteries on Malvern Hill.
The fate of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac hangs in the balance in the coming battle.
If the Confederates successfully seize the hill, it would spell disaster for McClellan’s army.
When the clock strikes two, the first Confederate shots of the Battle of Malvern Hill are fired,
and the final clash of the Peninsula Campaign begins in earnest.