You hear it all the time: Göring persuaded Hitler that the Luftwaffe could successfully
supply the 6th Army encircled at Stalingrad. Let’s take a look at what the books say -
Overy says -
“Hermann Goering, who accompanied Hitler, promised to supply Paulus from the air with
500 tons a day.”
Shirer says -
“Nevertheless, Goering assured Hitler that the Air Force could do the job.”
Manstein says -
“That Göring would commit the supreme frivolity of promising an adequate airlift and then
not even lay himself out to produce at least what he had available was something no soldier
could foresee.” Manstein, E. “Lost Victories.” Zenith
Wikipedia - the greatest source of false information going - says -
“When the Sixth Army was surrounded by the end of November in Operation Uranus,
Göring promised that the Luftwaffe would be able to deliver a minimum of 300 tons of supplies
to the trapped men every day.” Wikipedia. “Hermann Göring. Decline on
Wow, that's a really dumb decision. I mean, if you think about it, it doesn’t even make any
sense. Why would Göring commit to something if he knows he can't commit to? I mean, what’s
the motivation behind this? Clearly, something else is going on here. And I think it’s
time that we tackle the myth.
So as not to get the facts wrong, here’s a direct quote from David Glantz -
“On 20 November, General Hans Jeschonnek, chief of staff of the Luftwaffe, arrived at
Berchtesgaden to discuss the air force’s role in future breakout or relief operations.
Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring, the titular head of the Luftwaffe, was chairing a petroleum
conference at his country estate, Karinhall. Foreseeing an encirclement, Hitler asked Jeschonnek
whether the Luftwaffe could supply Sixth Army by air for the (supposedly) short time before
Manstein could relieve the siege. Jeschonnek replied that such an airlift was possible,
assuming that the Luftwaffe retained control of forward airfields.”
Hermann Göring was nowhere near when the initial decision was made. In fac, it was General Hans
Jeschonnek - a guy you’ve probably never heard of - who persuaded Hitler that the airlift
was possible.
“It seems that Jeschonnek - aware of Richthofen’s pessimistic attitude, but possibly misjudging
the basic conditions - did at least not dispute the possibility of temporary aerial provisioning
in principle.”
However, during a telephone conversation with General von Richthofen -
“The outspoken commander of Fourth Air Fleet soon convinced the chief of staff that an
airlift was impossible. Yet when Jeschonnek attempted to dissuade Hitler, the Führer
brushed him aside. Predictably, Hitler based all his future decisions on Jeschonnek’s
ill-considered initial agreement that the airlift could be accomplished. When Göring
arrived at Berchtesgaden on 22 November, he felt compelled to pledge that the Luftwaffe
could accomplish the mission, even though there had been no opportunity to calculate
the tonnages involved.”
Yes, Göring agreed with Jeschonnek’s initial decision two days after Jeschonnek made it.
But he was not the person to persuade Hitler that the airlift was possible. And he only
agrees with Jeschonnek because he didn’t want to go against his decision and also doesn’t
want to go against Hitler. Hitler, who had already accepted Jeschonnek’s initial assessment,
stubbornly refused to accept the possibility that the airlift couldn’t succeed, and the
rest is history.
I do think it’s hilarious though that several authors get it wrong, or even seem to make
stuff up.
“But Göring assured Hitler that it could be done. Jeschonnek did not contradict him.”
That’s the exact opposite of what actually happened! Even the beloved Beevor in his highly
popular Stalingrad book (and I’m not sure what he was smoking as he wrote this) says
“Reichsmarschall Goering, on hearing what the Führer wanted, immediately summoned a
meeting of his transport officers. He told them that 500 tons a day was needed. (The
Sixth Army’s estimate of 700 tons was ignored.) They replied that 350 tons would be the maximum,
and then only for a short period. Goering, with breath-taking irresponsibility, promptly
assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe could maintain the Sixth Army in its present position by
air.”
Where did he get this information from? It sounds like he mixes up two events, the initial
decision made on the 20th by Jeschonnek and the fact that Göring arrived on the 22nd
and probably spoke with Jeschonnek. I think the fact that Beever writes “on
hearing what the Führer wanted” probably suggests that Hitler had already made his decision.
Which then, you’d think - ok, but why did Hitler make this initial decision? And then, digging
further, you’ll realize it’s actually because Jeschonnek had already persuaded him.
But by reading Beevor as it is, and other authors as well, you get the impression that Göring was the man who
made the initial decision. But that’s not the case, that is a myth.
This is another example of how lies, myths and legends can work their way into the
historical narrative. In the coming weeks, I hope to dispel several more Stalingrad myths and lies,
so if you haven’t already, subscribe to the channel and
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