Is the Metropolitan Police institutionally corrupt?
That the Metropolitan Police, the largest police
force in the United Kingdom, is institutionally corrupt
is the finding of the independent panel into the 1987
murder of Daniel Morgan and its aftermath of successive failed
investigations and collapsed prosecutions.
The panel was appointed in 2013, and now, eight years later,
has published a three-volume, 1,256-page report.
The report is detailed and methodical, sourced
and footnoted, based on interviews and thousands
of documents.
But does the report make out this finding
of institutional corruption?
How does the report define this term?
Does the report apply this term consistently?
Does the report show what is caught by the definition
and what is not?
And does the report substantiate what is a serious charge?
For it is one thing to assert that there
is institutional corruption, but it
is another to demonstrate it.
Note the report makes the finding
of institutional corruption in the present tense
and not just in a historical sense.
That there is institutional corruption in 2021 and not just
in the late 1980s and 1990s.
At a press conference for the publication of a report,
a member of the panel said, "Institutional corruption is
not used in a historic sense.
It is used in a current sense."
Corruption in the Metropolitan Police is not new.
Sir Robert Mark, commissioner of the Metropolitan Police from
1972 to 1977, wrote in 1978 that the CID of the Metropolitan
Police was the most routinely corrupt organisation in London.
And that there were problems on the institutional plane
in the Metropolitan Police is also not new.
The MacPherson report into the police failings
in respect of the investigation into the murder of Stephen
Lawrence found institutional racism.
The MacPherson report said the investigation
was marred by a combination of professional incompetence,
institutional racism and a failure of leadership
by senior officers.
The MacPherson report defined institutional racism
as consisting of the collective failure of an organisation
to provide an appropriate and professional service to people
because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin.
It can be seen or detected in processes,
attitudes and behaviour, which amount to discrimination
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance,
thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage
minority ethnic people.
So corruption at the Metropolitan Police is not new.
And that there are problems institutionally
at the Metropolitan Police is also not new.
But what about institutional corruption?
The Daniel Morgan independent panel
were explicitly required to look into the question of corruption
at the Metropolitan Police.
The terms of reference stated, "The purpose and remit
of the independent panel is to shine a light
into the circumstances of Daniel Morgan's murder, its background
and the handling of the case over the whole period
since 1987.
In doing so, the panel will seek to address
the questions arising, including the role played
by police corruption in protecting those
responsible for the murder from being
brought to justice and the failure
to confront that corruption."
The panel adopted a broad definition of corruption
for the purposes of the report.
The definition was based on key elements of dishonesty
and benefit and allowed for the involvement
of a variety of actors and a variety of forms of benefit.
The panel included in this definition
some instances of failures on the part of senior officers
and managers in failing to identify corruption,
failing to confront corruption, failing
to manage investigations, and failing
to take a fresh look at past mistakes and failures,
and so on.
These failings do not all automatically fall
within the definition of corruption.
Some may result from professional incompetence
or poor management.
However, when the failures cannot reasonably be explained
as genuine error and indicate dishonesty for the benefit
of the organisation, in the panel's view,
they amount to institutional corruption.
The panel identified failures in the original investigation.
As regards the original murder investigation,
it is not clear in every instance which failings were
attributable to corruption and which to incompetence,
poor management, failures to comply with national policy
and police practise falling far below the expected standards
at the time.
There are examples of all of these in the first two
investigations.
The Metropolitan Police's lack of candour,
both about corruption and about other failings,
obscures the truth still further.
When failings in police investigations are combined
with unjustified reassurances rather than candour on the part
of the Metropolitan Police, this may constitute institutional
corruption.
The Metropolitan Police's culture of obfuscation
and a lack of candour is unhealthy in any public
service.
Concealing or denying failings for the sake
of your organisation's public image is dishonesty on the part
of the organisation for reputational benefit.
In the panel's view, this constitutes a form
of institutional corruption.
The report provides examples of corruption
in the noninstitutional sense.
For example, the leakage of police information to people
suspected of criminal offences.
But the report also provides a number
of illustrative examples of what it means
by institutional corruption.
And these are taken from both the earliest
and most recent investigations.
These illustrative examples show how the first investigation was
compromised by serious mistakes and incompetence,
but then shows the failure of senior management
to confront that corruption promptly.
The investigation had already been compromised, including
through loss of evidence and forensic failures causing
irretrievable damage to the prospects of successfully
bringing those responsible for the murder to justice.
Senior management was responsible for lack
of effective oversight of the first investigation and failure
to act promptly to confront corruption.
A further example is provided of a senior police officer seeking
to cover up any possibility of police involvement
in the murder of Daniel Morgan.
And the problems are not only within the Metropolitan Police.
The report provides an example of institutional corruption
involving multiple organisations.
Three organisations, Hampshire Constabulary,
the Metropolitan Police and the Police Complaints Authority,
accepted the omissions and inaccuracies in a final report
despite their awareness to the contrary.
Their acceptance of this final report and their failure to act
cannot reasonably be explained as coincidence or as genuine
error.
These cumulative failures amount to institutional corruption
on the part of all three organisations.
The report also details the problems
the panel has had since it was established in 2013.
There was not insignificant obstruction
to the panel's work.
At times, the contact between the panel and the Metropolitan
Police resembled police contact with litigants,
rather than with a body established by the Home
Secretary to inquire into the case
and to which the Metropolitan Police had
promised to make exceptional and full disclosure.
The panel concludes that despite the expressed commitment
by the Metropolitan Police in the terms of reference
to support the panel's work, the Metropolitan Police did not
approach for panel's scrutiny with candour in an open,
honest and transparent way, making exceptional and full
disclosure of relevant documents.
The family of Daniel Morgan suffered grievously
as a consequence of the failure to bring his murderers
to justice.
The unwarranted assurances which they were given,
the misinformation which was put into the public domain
and the denial of the failings in investigation,
including failing to acknowledge professional incompetence,
individuals' venal behaviour, and managerial
and organisational failures.
The Metropolitan Police also repeatedly failed
to take a fresh, thorough and critical look at past failings.
The lack of candour and the repeated failure to take
a fresh, thorough and critical look at past failings are all
symptoms of institutional corruption which prioritises
institutional reputation over public accountability.
So, in this report, the panel has
provided a definition of corruption generally
and the definition of institutional corruption
in particular.
It has shown what is caught within this definition
and what is not caught by this definition.
It has also provided a number of examples
to illustrate institutional corruption
from the first investigation onwards.
The panel can, therefore, be seen
as having substantiated the serious finding
of institutional corruption in the Metropolitan Police.
But in response to this report, some
have either not acknowledged or denied this finding
of institutional corruption.
Sir Ian Blair, commissioner of the Metropolitan Police
from 2005 to 2008, said, "The allegation
that the Met is institutionally corrupt is just not true.
There is no evidence of systematic corruption
in the Metropolitan Police."
And the Metropolitan Police itself
in its published response to the report
made no mention of institutional corruption.
"We accept corruption and the malicious acts
of corrupt individuals were a major factor in the failure
of the first investigation.
The Met of today is not the Met of 34 years ago."
The report of the Daniel Morgan independent panel mentions
the word corruption 718 times in a 1,256-page document.
It provides detailed examples of corruption,
of obstruction and of delay.
Indeed, the final documents were not provided to the panel
by the Met until 2021.
Former and current senior police officers may not recognise
institutional corruption and they may even deny that there
is such a thing as institutional corruption.
But the Metropolitan Police are going
to have to provide a far more substantial response
to this substantially made-out charge,
otherwise there will be a risk of institutional denial.