GARY SCHMITT: The United States faces security threats from multiple states and groups,
and in multiple regions of the world.
But it does so at a time when public opinion is less supportive of American efforts to
address those threats than anytime in decades.
Since the inconclusive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the 2008 financial crash, America’s appetite for global security leadership has
dropped dramatically.
When he entered office, President Obama pledged to rebuild the country by moving away from
“nation-building abroad” to “nation-building at-home.”
BARACK OBAMA: ...and use the rest to do some nation-building right here at home!
GARY SCHMITT: Likewise, when running for president, Donald Trump questioned the wars America had been
fighting and the value of America’s alliances abroad.
DONALD TRUMP: ...have dragged us into foreign wars that have made us less safe...
GARY SCHMITT: Both presidents believed that a forward-leaning American military presence is costly
and at times counterproductive, involving us in conflicts and competitions with other powers that are
not, they argued, in our national interest.
But the policies of retrenchment have not
brought us greater peace and stability.
In the cases of Russia, China, and Iran, efforts to normalize relations have not lessened tensions.
To the contrary, each nation has read US policies and cuts to defense spending as signs of American
weakness and decline.
If anything, American retrenchment has fueled the ambitions of Russia, China and Iran...
not appeased them.
As a result, we face growing uncertainty in three regions of the world—Europe, Asia
and the Middle East—that American statecraft has long understood to be the linchpins of
global peace and security.
However, that begs the question of why the
United States should care now?
After all, the threats posed by the three states are far from American shores.
Some even argue that the US might concede greater sway in a region to these rising powers
in the expectation that they will then become satisfied powers.
But history suggests otherwise.
New levels of dominance in a region inevitably introduces new interests and new concerns
for the rising power.
Moreover, states that neighbor the rising power will have an interest in pushing back
against such dominance or, if unable to do so, appeasing the rising power.
In either case, the rising power will have created the kinds of tensions and instability
that inevitably prevent a rising power from becoming a satisfied power.
The security dilemma posed by a rising power is further fueled by the specific character
of that state.
In this case, all three countries—Russia, China and Iran—are illiberal and present
themselves as challengers to the democratic West.
By their very nature, they rest uneasy in a world now dominated by liberal trade and
politics, and where the dominant power is still the United States.
It’s undeniable that American prosperity
and security are enhanced when America is the dominant power in Europe, Asia and the
Middle East.
However, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, America took its eye off the ball.
As a result, some Americans started to believe in the “end of history,” the idea that
the ideological conflicts of the 19th and 20th century had come to a close.
Others simply wanted the peace dividend that came with the end of the Cold War.
With no serious challengers to threaten American security, support for military spending and
global deployments eroded.
Americans continued to profess the values of a global leadership, but they thought the
nation could do as much while shrinking the military and reducing its overseas presence.
FIREMAN: Battalion One to Manhattan.
We just had a plane crash into the upper floors of the World Trade Center.
Most Americans believe that 9/11 changed things, stirring Americans from their delusions about
the dawn of an era of absolute security.
But despite substantial investments in fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, successive
US presidents declined to make the long-term investments necessary to modernize the military.
As a result, the American military is losing its qualitative edge and is too small to address
the various global challenges it now faces.
Once the envy of the world, America’s military can no longer confidently “shock and awe”
its adversaries.
To restore the world order, Congress and the
White House must adopt a long-term perspective.
The US cannot focus on what changes—threats and technologies.
Instead, America must recognize what remains constant—American security interests and
political principles.
Defending the liberal order is in our interest.
And it is best done with allies who, in exchange for American security guarantees, have by
and large allowed the United States to construct a global order that is both in our image, and to
our advantage.
To learn more about national security and American global leadership,
check out the link to my new book "Rise of the Revisionists" in the description below.
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