The China-Burma-India theater, more recognizable by the name CBI, is one of the most important
theaters of the Pacific War.
It was here that the Japanese had been fighting since 1937, it was here that the Empire of
the Rising Sun had most of its land forces and it was here where one of their primary
goals laid: dominion over East Asia.
But the contributions of the forces fighting in this gruesome theater are often not well
known.
Today, after the epic conclusion of the Guadalcanal Campaign and after the end of the bloody Battle
of Buna-Gona, we finally return to China, Burma and India to cover some new developments
that were unfolding during the months of January and February, with new operations taking place
in China, with more political bickering going on in India and with the start of one of the
most recognizable long-range penetration expeditions: Operation Longcloth.
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Our story first takes us back to the spring of 1942.
While Generals Stilwell and Slim were fighting to escape annihilation at Burma, Colonel Orde
Wingate was appointed by General Wavell to organize some guerrilla units that were going
to be employed to fight behind Japanese lines.
Wavell had first met Wingate during the Arab revolts in British Palestine, as the Indian
officer began to organize the Special Night Squads, a joint British-Jewish counterinsurgency
military unit that frequently ambushed Arab saboteurs who attacked oil pipelines of the
Iraq Petroleum Company.
Wavell recalled: “I first met Wingate when I took over command in Palestine in 1937 and
found him on my intelligence staff.
I inquired about him and was told he was rather an oddity, clever but eccentric . He… knew
Arabic well, but since coming to Palestine had developed pronounced Zionist tendencies
and was now learning Yiddish or Hebrew.
When I met him I realized that there was a remarkable personality behind those piercing
eyes and rather abrupt manner.
He was obviously no respecter of persons because of their rank”.
When World War Two began, Wingate was invited to Sudan by Wavell, then commander-in-chief
of Middle East Command, to begin operations against Italian occupation forces in Ethiopia.
Thus, he created Gideon Force, a special operations force composed of British, Sudanese and Ethiopian
soldiers that would harass Italian forts and their supply lines with the aid of local resistance
fighters while regular army units took on the main Italian army.
It was during this time that he first met Slim and that he first began to develop his
concept of “Long-Range Penetration”, which proposed that it was possible for units well
behind the front lines to conduct regular warfare.
Rather than standard guerrilla, Wingate therefore wanted to employ small bands of men in hit-and-run
raids or sabotage, relying on company or even battalion-size forces to engage the enemy.
He even said that “in the back areas are [the enemy’s] unprotected kidneys, his midriff,
his throat, and other vulnerable points…
The more vital and tender points of the enemy’s anatomy [we hit]... [the more the] enemy would
have to withdraw troops from the front in order to protect them”.
Yet Burma was a far different topographical and tactical theater than the plains and deserts
of the Middle East and East Africa , where the fight was against poorly-motivated Italian
soldiers.
Because of that, during his first months in Burma and India, Wingate had to carefully
study the terrain, the resources, and the disposition of the enemy forces.
Finally, in August 1942, Wingate was promoted to the rank of brigadier to command the 77th
Indian Brigade, joined by experienced guerrilla fighters such as Major Michael Calvert . This
brigade was formed by a battalion of young Gurkhas from Nepal; a battalion of the Burma
Rifles that mixed Karen, Kachin and Chin people; and the inexperienced British 13th Battalion
from the King’s Regiment.
A scattering of RAF officers and noncoms also joined Wingate’s forces to coordinate by
radio the necessary air drops.
Wingate’s unit, popularly known as the Chindits , would have to undergo a brutal training
period, with prolonged marches in sweltering heat and mock battles.
They learned to leave established trails that could harbor ambushes and to hack their way
through dense undergrowth.
Furthermore, Wingate strictly imposed a series of directives , such as to eat at least one
raw onion per day or to only wear shorts when raining, and he also inspired his men to forage
until they could subsist on the fauna around them.
Inevitably, the strict regimen proved too much for many, especially the older; and so,
in September of 1942, about 200 of them had to be replaced with younger or more fit men
drafted from other units.
Those who survived the training ordeal, however, developed a strong sense of self-esteem.
In 1943, as part of the strategy that began with the campaign in the Arakan, Wavell had
plotted the insertion of the Chindits into Central Burma.
Yet the British were facing many obstacles at Arakan and the planned operations against
northern Burma had to be suspended, so Wavell feared that the Japanese could fully concentrate
on Wingate’s incursion.
Nonetheless, Wingate persuaded Wavell to let him proceed into Burma anyway, so Operation
Longcloth was eventually approved.
3000 soldiers and nearly 1000 animals were to be dispatched over the Chindwin in points
where the long, sinuous river was not manned by the enemy.
The first objective for the Chindits was a north-to-south rail line used by the Japanese
to supply and reinforce their forces in China.
It was expected that demolition of the railway might force the enemy to devote resources
to protecting it and signal the ability of the British Empire to mount an offensive after
enduring such a long series of beatings in the East.
On February 12, Wingate thus set out with his Chindits organized into seven separate
columns to cross the Chindwin River at two places 35 miles apart, so as to confuse the
enemy.
They used inflatable dinghies, rafts hacked out of the bamboo, and vegetation and ropes.
The Southern Group under Lieutenant-Colonel Leigh Alexander , consisting of only two columns
, had successfully crossed the Chindwin at Auktang by February 16.
There, the RAF had carried a large supply drop to draw the attention of the Japanese
and Major John Jeffries had also been sent disguised as a brigadier to convince the enemy
that Wingate was with them.
The Gurkhas would then have to fight their way towards an elephant path southeast of
Maingnyaung , from where they would destroy the railway station at Kyaikthin.
The ensuing days were a tale of hunger and exhaustion for the commandos, wading through
streams for miles and manhandling loads while on short rations, until they finally arrived
in the Thaiktaw area by late February , where they received the long-awaited supply drop.
Meanwhile, the Northern Group under Wingate and Lieutenant-Colonel Sidney Cooke, consisting
of the remaining five columns , had stealthily crossed the Chindwin at Tonhe by February
14.
Overconfident because of their absolute victory during the Invasion of Burma and believing
that the area to the west of the Zibyu mountains was not suitable for large-scale operations,
the Japanese hardly defended the path that the Chindits were taking.
Once across, Columns 3 and 5 were sent to cut the railway line in as many places as
possible and the remaining three columns were ordered to seek out and engage the enemy.
Yet unbeknownst to them, an imprecise supply drop had jettisoned its load of mail on a
sandbank within a mile or two of a Japanese outpost the following day, directly alerting
them of the British presence in the area and giving them the complete order of battle of
the Chindits.
As a result, the Japanese began to evacuate the area on February 19, successfully evacuating
all posts between the Chindwin and the Mu Valley by February 24.
In the meantime, the Chindits would arrive at Myene on February 15, where they received
their first supply drop.
In that village, there was also an incident with a girl that complained about the behavior
of one of the British soldiers, so the commandos were given a strict warning directly from
the top that if anyone interfered with a Burmese girl, Wingate would personally shoot that
man in front of the assembled villagers.
As he pointed out, their lives were dependent on these villagers being on their side.
The Chindits then received reports of Japanese troops at Sinlamaung, so a big party under
Colonel Cooke would be sent to raid them, arriving on the night of February 24 only
to find that the enemy had already fled.
By the end of February, the commandos had received another supply drop at Tonmakeng
and they had then crossed the Zibyu Taungdan Range by a little known path which had been
used during the retreat to India.
We have to leave the Chindits for now, but we’ll continue to cover their impressive
expedition in the future.
Instead, we have to take a quick detour to Morocco, where the Allies had met at the Casablanca
Conference from January 14 to 24, 1943.
During their discussions about their overall strategy for the next stage of the war, the
US and the UK would reaffirm their strategy of Europe First, yet many differences would
arise during the debates about the war with Japan.
As the circumstances had changed and the Allies now held the initiative in the Pacific, the
Americans were planning to develop offensive and defensive operations against Japan parallel
with operations in the Mediterranean, believing it to be a mistake to give the Japanese time
to consolidate their conquests in the Pacific.
Whereas the British underestimated the Japanese capabilities, believing that the enemy war
effort was incapable of much further expansion provided communications with Germany were
kept severed; experience had shown to the Americans that the Japanese fought with no
idea of surrendering and would continue to be aggressive until defeated by attrition.
In that regard, Admiral King wanted to apply constant pressure upon the Japanese with the
continuation of a series of limited offensives in the Pacific, and General Marshall proposed
to augment the total amount of Allied resources for the Pacific theater from 15% to 30%.
The British opposed this, as they argued that the most effective way of bringing the war
to a swift conclusion was to concentrate everything on defeating Germany and then to devote all
possible resources against Japan.
Though there would be no agreement during this conference, Casablanca would foreshadow
the larger role of thinking and planning for the strategic offensive against Japan in the
future Allied strategic councils . As for the CBI theater, planning continued
for Operation Anakim and the Burma offensive, yet the British were similarly unenthusiastic
about extensive commitments in this theater as well.
The British argued that the depleted condition of their Eastern Fleet prevented them from
carrying a naval supremacy campaign in the Bay of Bengal, so in the end, Chiang Kai-Shek
would refuse to support an incursion into northern Burma because of the lack of British
naval forces at hand.
Thus, Operation Anakim would have to be projected for late 1943 without any previous Chinese
attack towards the Salween.
During this meeting, President Roosevelt would also state his intentions to treat China as
a great power, an ally to be built up for war and postwar purposes, as he believed that
China might eventually serve the Allied cause in a position somewhat analogous to that of
the USSR in the war against Germany.
Therefore, he wanted to send a larger amount of resources to China to make more use of
Chinese bases and manpower, and he was also adamant that the supply routes to China were
to be reopened.
Yet nonetheless, as the focus remained in Europe and the prospects for an enlarged scale
of operations in the Pacific were growing, the CBI was likely to receive the short end
of the stick . Lastly, another important effect of the Casablanca Conference is that the Free
French forces led by Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud began to be recognized as
preferred partners of the Allies.
Up until now, the Japanese had recognized only the Vichy government as legitimate, so
they had decided not to declare war on the Free French forces.
They would thus respect the sovereignty of French territories in Asia, like the concession
of Guangzhouwan, which declared itself a part of Free France.
The only exception was French Indochina, which was invaded in September 1940, but was allowed
to remain under nominal Vichy control; yet for the case of Guangzhouwan, the Japanese
would only establish an exclusion zone around the French colony.
In turn, Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime recognized Free France as Guangzhouwan’s legitimate
authority, with many Chinese soldiers of the 4th War Area escaping to the French colony
where Japanese forces couldn’t harm them.
After the Casablanca Conference, however, Tokyo finally decided to put an end to the
French presence in China and ordered the 23rd Army of General Sakai to establish a strong
presence in the Luichow Peninsula.
On February 13, two battalions of the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade thus departed Hong
Kong en route to the Luichow Peninsula, landing on the village of Peichatsun three days later
and immediately engaging the scarce Chinese defenders.
With strong determination, the Japanese rapidly made its way through 1500-meters of knee-deep
shoals to capture the towns of Hsinlaitsun and Haikang, forcing the Chinese forces to
withdraw towards Suichi.
On February 17, the invaders would then continue northwards, eliminating the last center of
enemy resistance on Chengyue Shih; and in the next few days, they would capture the
towns of Suichi and Chihkan, thus completing the encirclement of the French colony and
finally forcing the Chinese to retreat into the interior of the country.
After some negotiations with representatives of Guangzhouwan, the French would have no
other choice but to declare the leased territory an open city, so the Japanese would occupy
Guangzhouwan without a fight.
Additionally, a third battalion of the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade landed on the northern
part of Hainan Island and established a base at the Haikou Bay.
The operation was a total success for the Japanese Empire, allowing them to link the
Luichow Peninsula with the occupied zones of the province of Guangxi and to eliminate
Guangzhouwan as a possible base for an Allied offensive.
Back in China, Stilwell's initial and personal reaction to the Generalissimo's withdrawal
from the projected March 1943 offensive was an indignant one; but, after he had surveyed
the new situation and mapped out his course of action, he wrote in his diary that it was
a "damn good thing March 1 is off.
We'd have been hung".
Furthermore, Stilwell believed the Chinese very likely would try to compensate for their
withdrawal, so he decided to present again his now-familiar proposals for reorganization
and concentration of the Chinese Army, service schools, and an efficient logistical organization.
The proposed agreement also had three significant new points: to assist in the reorganization,
training, and future planning of the Chinese Air Force, under Chennault's control; to develop
a line of communications from the terminus of the Burma Road to east China; and to propose
that the designation and reorganization of the second Thirty Divisions begin at once.
As the program to build effective Chinese infantry divisions at Ramgarh proceeded, even
though Chinese commanders laid their typical complaints during their stay in India, the
China Air Task Force continued to sting the enemy with its limited resources, with Chennault
periodically dispatching his small fleet of B-25s and P-40s against Japanese targets,
particularly shipping in harbors.
Relying on surprise and deception to give its raiders an edge, the CATF would manage
to cause much damage to the Japanese air forces in China.
Yet Chennault was dissatisfied with these achievements and wanted to do more, arguing
that if he were given sufficient strength in bombers and fighters, then the Japanese
could be defeated through strategic bombing without having to do a slow and costly campaign
in manpower and war materials.
Because of this, General Arnold was dispatched to determine the feasibility of Chennault’s
proposals, but he instead found too many logistical obstacles to make Chennault’s plans a reality.
Next episode we’ll head back to the Aleutian and Solomon Islands, where new developments
are about to unfold, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button
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