At the beginning of World War 2, when Germans arrived in France after taking over Poland,
the Wehrmacht’s Panzer divisions shook the world to its core.
The panzer division was much more than just a force of massed tanks; it was a combined
arms team centered around the tank. In a Life magazine article published in 1940, an accurate
depiction of the shockingly successful German army in the offense described them as [QUOTE]:
“It is not one single weapon, and it's not even a new kind of warfare. It is simply a
more ingenious development and use of every kind of modern weapon that has hitherto been seen.”
Faced with this unprecedented threat, the United States Army found itself in a state
of palpable urgency. A New doctrine was needed and fast. In late 1941,
the War Department inaugurated a unique military concept: The tank destroyer.
By emphasizing rapid response, potent firepower, and mobility over heavy armor,
the program aimed to cultivate a specialized force that could quickly engage and neutralize
advancing enemy tanks, preventing them from outmaneuvering or overwhelming U.S. defenses.
Would this audacious tank destroyer doctrine be the linchpin that finally halted the German
Panzer Juggernaut, or had the U.S. gambled its military future on a strategy few understood?
Tank Warfare
First introduced by the British Army in the Battle of the Somme in July 1916,
the first armored vehicles were clunky, unreliable, difficult to operate,
slow, and capable of only limited participation in a combined arms team.
Soon, however, different versions of tank technology found their way into French,
American, and, of course, German armies as well.
After World War 1, while European tank designers greatly enhanced their designs,
those working on anti-tank technology lagged in innovation.
In other European conflicts in the interwar period,
like the Spanish Civil War, tanks were used without decisive results. This
did little to alert many nations about the growing threat posed by the tanks.
But deep in Germany's rising Third Reich, the rearmament program,
instigated by Führer Adolf Hitler in 1935, gave General Heinz Guderian carte blanche.
Guderian then created the first Panzer—German for tank—divisions.
These Panzer divisions were so much more than just a force of massed tanks:
they were a combined arms team centered around the vehicle.
The German General was also one of the earliest proponents of the blitzkrieg
approach, a surprise attack using a rapid and overwhelming force concentration. He advocated
using these massed Panzer divisions to strike at strategic objectives deep in the enemy's rear.
When Germany invaded France on May 10, 1940, the Anglo-French forces initially appeared
numerically and technically superior, with a greater quantity of medium and heavy vehicles.
Soon, German crews, trained and experienced in the new combined tactics of dive bombers,
anti-tank guns, and, most importantly, tanks, would get a chance to prove the
efficacy of this novel concept. The Loss That Shocked The World
During the invasion, the heart of this team lay in the fast-moving German armor. In particular,
the Wehrmacht exploited the advantages of the Panzer III tank, which had a modern radio
communications system and had three men inside the turret, resulting in greater efficiency.
With their Blitzkrieg strategy, the Wehrmacht emphasized speed, surprise, and encirclement.
Through Panzer divisions with close air support,
the Germans rapidly pushed through the Ardennes, a region believed to be impassable for a large army.
Although France possessed a combination of both light and heavy tanks,
these weapons were built following French doctrine, which viewed them primarily as
infantry support weapons. To defeat German armor, they relied on anti-tank guns,
of which they had neither the numbers nor the doctrine to effectively stop it.
French Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Labarthe would later characterize the action by writing: [QUOTE]
"Our tanks, poorly armed, could not protect our infantry, devoid of anti-tank weapons
and forced to fight in the open terrain. The success of the enemy could only have followed."
In just over six weeks, France signed an armistice with Germany on June 22, 1940, effectively ending
French resistance. The destruction of the French Army, the sixth-largest army in the
world at the time and one of the most iconic in history shocked the world, including America.
The Tank Destroyer Command
Having read through dozens of reports from Europe and knowing
the army as it was currently organized was unprepared for war against German armor,
Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, with much determination, set out to transform the
army into a force strong enough to stop German tanks, with the help of Tank Destroyer Vehicles.
In a letter from November 27, 1941, Marshall
ordered the activation of a Tank Destroyer Tactical Firing Center. The following day,
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew D. Bruce was named the head of the Anti-tank Planning Board.
Working alongside General Lesley McNair, the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters,
with the newly established United States Army Tank Destroyer Command, the two men were determined to
prevent the American Army from suffering the same fate as the British, French, and Belgian Armies.
Based on guidance from the War Department,
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce knew he had two primary missions: to develop the doctrine
that tank destroyer forces would train and fight with and to create the ultimate tank destroyer.
With the M3 vehicle already in production, Bruce, the National Defense Research Committee, and the
Inventors Council decided to design a vehicle specifically for the newly established force.
Requirements for the new weapon included a fast-moving vehicle armed with a weapon that
was easy to operate with a powerful punch and with enough armor protection against
small arms fire so that a machine gun could not disable the weapon.
Meanwhile, a second vehicle would bridge the gap
between the hastily improvised M3 and the one called for by Bruce.
While the Ordnance Board began work on a specialized vehicle for the tank destroyers,
the Tank Destroyer Force was training to enter service in Africa.
Camp Hood
In January 1942, the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center established its base in Killeen,
Texas. Camp Hood swiftly became the epicenter of all tank destroyer activities,
from the training and activation of units to the evolution of doctrine and equipment.
The foundational doctrine for all tank destroyer operations was articulated in the FM 18-5 Tank
Destroyer Field Manual, released in June of that year. This manual reinforced the aggressive,
offensive spirit inherent in the tank destroyers. It unequivocally stated: [QUOTE]
"There is but one objective of tank destroyer units,[...]
It is the destruction of hostile tanks."
The document provided specific guidance on the strategic deployment of tank destroyers. While
a minimal number of tank destroyers would cover obstacles, the majority were to be
held in reserve, amplifying their effectiveness once engaged against the primary enemy armor.
The essence of their operations was encapsulated in their memorable motto [QUOTE]:
"Seek... Strike and Destroy!"
At Camp Hood, the Tank Hunting Course became a pivotal part of the training regimen.
Inspired by British commando training courses, this inventive course replicated a battlefield
environment, complete with a "Nazi village" replete with unexpected targets and traps.
As time progressed, Camp Hood expanded into a sprawling complex. At its peak,
it simultaneously trained twenty-eight battalions and eight groups.
Given the urgency of the African campaign,
some early battalions were given as little as seven weeks of training before deployment,
a stark contrast to the usual two to three months typically allocated for unit training.
Yet, as the inaugural tank destroyer units braced for their maiden combat experience,
McNair remained determined to validate his tank destroyer doctrine.
Tank Destroyers In Africa
As Operation Torch ushered Allied forces into Africa,
seven tank destroyer battalions faced combat for the first time.
However, their doctrine didn't align seamlessly with real battle scenarios.
Major General Orlando Ward of the 1st Armored Division in Tunisia noted German tanks advanced
at a glacial pace. Contrary to the manual's suggestion of superior firepower, by 1943,
German tanks possessed more advanced weaponry.
These theory-to-practice discrepancies made it hard
for the tank destroyers to execute their mission.
Five months in, by March 23, 1943, the battalions hadn't engaged any major German forces.
But the 601st was about to change that.
Defending the division's southern flank along Keddab Ridge at El Guettar,
they were directly in the path of the formidable German 10th Panzer Division.
The 10th Panzer's advance fragmented into three attacks. Two overwhelmed several
infantry companies, threatening to reclaim Gafsa. However,
the largest prong aiming to outflank the 601st met a different fate.
When the tank destroyers reconnaissance company detected the approaching Germans,
the 601st adjusted their position. To better engage the enemy, the tank
destroyers chose their ground well, anchored their southernmost platoon to a dry lakebed,
and even laid out a belt of mines along their direct front.
In a fierce morning-long battle, the 601st obliterated thirty German tanks,
with their mines taking out eight more. By noon, after expending almost 3,000 shells and
close to 50,000 machine gun rounds, they sent the 10th Panzer reeling in retreat.
While choosing the right place at the right time helped prove the tank destroyer concept,
it was not without cost, as the 601st lost 24 out of their 36 M3 vehicles.
Based on the experiences in Africa, the Tank Destroyer Board began a revision of the manual
in May 1943. That same month, Orlando Ward assumed command of the Tank Destroyer Center at Camp Hood.
The victory at El Guettar would remain the only engagement of the North African and
Italian campaigns where a tank destroyer battalion met and stopped a concerted German tank attack.
The Italian Invasion
In October 1943, more and more Tank Destroyer Battalions finished training and poured into
England and Africa in preparation for the invasion of Italy. Around this time as well,
General Ward was succeeded in commanding the Tank Destroyer Center by Major General John H. Hester.
If Africa didn't serve as the definitive testbed for the tank destroyer's capabilities
as many had hoped, Italy proved to be equally inconclusive. Difficult terrain,
as well as conservative strategies in German offensive operations, limited tanks
to groups of up to 10, a stark contrast to the Panzer’s stellar role in France years before.
The continued absence of massed German armor made tank destroyers adapt to other tasks,
primarily as artillery support.
The Italian campaign saw more widespread use of the M10 Tank Destroyer. While this model
entered service to bridge the gap between the M3 and General Bruce's envisioned tank destroyer,
the M10 quickly found favor among its crews.
However, Bruce and his predecessors never truly accepted the model,
believing it was too heavy and slow for tank destroyer doctrine.
In Italy, General Bruce's vision was finally realized with the introduction of the M18 Hellcat.
While similar to the M10, the M18 had one remarkable feature absent in
previous models. Weighing just under twenty tons,
the model was the fastest combat vehicle produced by any army during the war.
With speeds of up to 50 miles an hour, the Hellcat outpaced its German adversaries.
Yet, the hilly Italian terrain meant the Hellcat never truly lived up to its full potential.
During the invasion, no single action aligned a
battalion of tank destroyers with a substantial enemy armor threat.
Back In The Ardennes
In June 1944, Major General Dawley took command of the Tank Destroyer Center.
He was well aware that with the tank destroyers now finally on French soil, the time to clearly,
once and for all, stress the doctrine of tank destroyers was rapidly fleeting.
By then, tank-versus-tank engagements had become more common, and U.S. tanks like the
M4 Sherman were upgraded to handle the German Panzer and Tiger tanks.
If the Germans were ever again to utilize massed armor formations, it would be soon.
As such, the Tank Destroyer Center convened in a conference in late June 1944 to revise the tank
destroyer manual and other doctrine documents. Now, tank destroyers could employ more flexible
tactics, spread out when enemy positions were uncertain, and bolster infantry anti-tank units.
Following the American breakthrough in Operation Cobra on the Cotentin Peninsula, towed tank
destroyers faced their first significant challenge against top-tier German armor.
Sadly, one of their chief proponents,
General Lesley McNair, perished by friendly fire during the operation's commencement.
The Germans, eager to regain their lost ground, launched a surprise counterattack on Mortain,
France, on August 6, catching the transitioning American forces off guard.
The 30th Infantry Division, unprepared for defense due to an ongoing change in guard,
quickly joined forces and collaborated with the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion to defend
St. Barthelemy. As the Germans mounted their offense with four Panzer Divisions, taking
advantage of the fog and limited visibility, the tank destroyers readied themselves into position.
Their engagements proved intense and close-quartered, with limited visibility
forcing them to target in the direction of the flashes of enemy gunfire. Throughout the day,
the 823rd decimated fourteen enemy tanks and a host of other vehicles.
This Seek, Strike, and Destroy mentality
earned the A and B companies of the 823rd a Presidential Unit Citation.
The End Of The War
In September 1944, the M36 Jackson Tank Destroyer arrived in Europe.
With its 90-millimeter gun that made it the most lethal armored
vehicle in the American arsenal, the vehicle became an instant success.
In the end, the M36 Tank Destroyer, not the M18, received the most publicity out of the Ardennes
fight. During this essential battle, according to military historian Hugh M. Cole: [QUOTE]
"Tank destroyers are clearly traceable in the Ardennes fighting as over and
over again influencing the course of battle."
After the German armor's defeat at the Ardennes,
their capability for massed armor attacks against the Allies diminished. With no more
offensive Panzer units, tank destroyers were often assigned secondary roles.
Though the concept of 'Seek, Strike, and Destroy' didn't fully succeed as a doctrine,
tank destroyers themselves created their own success where it counted most:
on the most decisive battlefields of World 2.